Why Russia Doesn't Hold the Keys to Syria

David J. Kramer, Lilia Shevtsova Op-Ed July 11, 2012 American Interest

Summary

Part of Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria stems from Putin's desire to use Russian foreign policy as an instrument for preserving his own power and trying to block the United States.

Related Topics

Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions

It is difficult to decipher whether those who argue that Russia holds the keys to the solution of the Syrian crisis really believe it or are using Russia as an excuse to do nothing. The recent Syrian Action Group meeting in Geneva clearly showed that the Kremlin is not moving closer to the position of the U.S. and other powers. Tremendous time and energy have been wasted in trying to lure Russia closer to the view that Assad needs to go. Over and over again, Russian officials have made clear that they are not interested in helping find a real, as opposed to imitation, solution to the Syria problem. In a July 9 meeting with Russia’s diplomatic corps, Vladimir Putin reconfirmed that he has not changed his position on Syria, reiterating his familiar mantra on the “political solution” and “dialogue” which barely masks his support for Bashir al-Assad. Continued Russian arms sales to the murderous Assad regime should be crystal clear evidence of which side Moscow favors in the conflict.

Shevtsova chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, dividing her time between Carnegie’s offices in Washington, DC, and Moscow. She has been with Carnegie since 1995.

Lilia Shevtsova

Senior Associate
Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program
Moscow Center

More from this author...

Before going any further, however, let’s be clear what we mean when we say “Russia”, vis-a-vis Syria or any other likeminded tyrant, for that matter. After all, it is Putin and his ilk who support and provide lifelines to such leaders around the world, whether it is Lukashenka in neighboring Belarus, Assad in Syria, or Chavez in Venezuela. Such support comes from the Kremlin, not Russia writ large, and certainly not from the Russian opposition or Russian civil society. It is critical to draw such a distinction.

With that clarified, let’s look at why Putin and the Kremlin have staked the position they have on Syria. What are the Kremlin’s motives for its obstinate defense of Assad?

Conventional wisdom offers several explanations. For starters, there are sales of Russian arms to Assad. About 75 percent of Syrian weapons come from Russia, and Syria is the fourth most lucrative market in the Russian arms trade, with $700 million delivered to Damascus in 2011. Then there is Russia’s small naval base at Tartus, the last Russian base in the Mediterranean. Syria is the last Soviet-era bastion and client state left in the Middle East, and the Kremlin does not want to lose it. Syria is also a gateway to Iran. Then there is Putin’s suspicion of the West and his knee-jerk reflex to resist American policy first and ask questions later. Putin also wants to remind the world that global problems can’t be resolved without Moscow and his personal participation.

All this is true, but there is something else at work as well. ...

Full text of the article in the American Interest

Source: http://carnegie.ru/2012/07/11/why-russia-doesn-t-hold-keys-to-syria/dudc