Three organizing principles to guide the use of American power in a fragmented world.
Excessive intrusions by the Chinese state to shore up confidence in the country’s financial markets are precisely what led to overheating.
Issues such as the Iran deal, the rise of the self-styled Islamic State, and the spread of Russian military and economic influence continue to highlight the importance of the Caucasus region on the world stage.
The appointment of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan can be viewed in two ways: as a victory for Pakistan (which clearly supports Mansour) or as the strengthening of radical tendencies within the Taliban.
Chaos in the Arab world has offered the Kremlin a convenient opportunity to shape public opinion at home on such issues as the legitimacy of the regime, its confrontation with the West, and the situation in Ukraine.
Following an initially cool reception, many former USSR republics have been lured by the sheer size of China’s investment in the One Belt One Road project, eager to capitalize on the wider initiative in line with their own domestic interests.
The Iran nuclear deal and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba are victories achieved through informal or semi-informal diplomacy. As for the Russian-American relations, this diplomacy successfully worked even during the Cold War—but not now.
Russia is a superpower in decline, and the challenge it poses to the United States is very different from that posed by the Soviet Union.
Although China’s stock market panic in the summer of 2015 has subsided, the fundamental questions have not been resolved, which leaves it open to possible continued volatility.
A theory of “hybrid war” based on the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine ignores both the chronology and cause-and-effect links between events on the ground.
Military-technical collaboration between India and Russia has been most productive in building India’s strategic naval capabilities. While India has a variety of defense partners, only Russia has provided it with a strategic dimension.
Among all the possible candidates for membership in the SCO, India and Pakistan seem the most ready for it. If they join the SCO in the near future, this will benefit not only these states, but also the organization itself.
The BRICS and the West are neither rivals nor partners. The BRICS isn’t challenging the West, but the West’s own growing weaknesses are empowering the BRICS.
Inordinate delays in executing joint aircraft production projects have meant that India and Russia have squandered their chances to become world leaders in this field.
Today, reaching out pro-actively to the non-West is the only realistic option for Moscow. It should view its role as an economic resource base, a diplomatic adviser, and a defense arsenal of the emerging community of the non-West.
The joint India-Russia missile project BrahMos has been the single most successful joint military-technical collaboration between the two countries, and it appears the prospects for its usage are just beginning. Both countries need to increase this kind of strategic collaboration.
Divisions exist among major nations about how to approach Putin, and his isolation is anything but watertight. At the same time, the Russians themselves are no less defiant of what they see as U.S. global domination.
Under totalitarian regimes, the state is the only force that shapes the condition of society. Vladimir Putin may not be there yet, but he certainly is moving in that direction.
Rather than thinking about some grand architecture for the future, all sides of the current Russian-Western conflict should step away from the brink.
Beginning with the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, an international arms control regime has limited existing nuclear arsenals and prevented further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But that entire system could soon unravel.
You are leaving the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy's website and entering another Carnegie global site.