The current political system that has emerged in Russia under Putin is best characterized by the political model of “overmanaged democracy,” a hybrid of democracy and authoritarianism.  Nikolai Petrov from the Carnegie Moscow Center and Henry Hale from the George Washington University spoke about the sustainability of overmanaged democracy as a form of governance in Russia. Petrov explained that, although this method of governance provides stability in the short- and medium-term, given the major challenges looming in the economic, social, and regional spheres, overmanaged democracy cannot provide long-term stability for Russia. Its dependence on the charismatic authority of a single popular leader and its vulnerability to shocks and succession crises could lead to a regime breakdown.

Russia is not a democratic nation, Petrov and Hale asserted, yet ruling authorities still cling to the trappings of democracy. The appearance of democracy provides benefits for authoritarian leaders, such as:

  • Generation of information helps the state identify society’s preferences and potential upcoming problems.
  • A system that allows citizens to provide feedback to their government, which makes the government more efficient.
  • Institutional mechanisms for reconciling various and conflicting opinions and interests.
  • Elections that enable a regime appear legitimate, help identify promising new leaders and assist the state in becoming more effective.
  • Truly independent media, which exist but are marginalized in a way that manipulates media market forces and takes advantage of inertia in media consumers’ habits. The fact that such media operate relatively independently lessens the feeling in society that freedom of expression is actually being repressed, thereby reducing incentives for those who value such freedom to rebel.
The authoritarian elements of overmanaged democracy dominate the democratic ones. And one of the chief features of this system is the creation of parallel structures of management–“substitutions” for weakened democratic institutions, including 13 councils and 8 commissions–all controlled by the executive branch. These entities serve real purposes for the regime by compensating for the functions that democracy usually reserves for the state and its leaders, but that these substitutions keep under the control of the executive authorities.
 
Professor Henry Hale noted that “the current stability of the system that we see tends to hinge entirely on leadership popularity and the actual capacity, the talent, of the leadership in actually exercising this manual control of the system in a competent way. And it becomes very vulnerable to succession crises, which become more acute to the extent that leaders are unpopular or incompetence. So far, the Kremlin has managed to do this, but one of our conclusions is that the system looks stable on the surface, but it is actually fairly fragile.”