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Russia’s association with Lukashenko’s crackdown may persuade Belarusians that it is impossible to be a pro-Russian democrat: that one can only be one or the other. Support for authoritarianism is going out of fashion in Belarus; pro-Russianness may, too.
Alex Gabuev and Marietje Schaake discuss the governance of the digital domain in the coronavirus era.
This is not a call for a reset or a new partnership, but rather for a responsible, less hostile relationship between rivals bitterly divided by visions of world order, geopolitical interests, and values.
Faced with a pandemic, growing inequality, and widespread dissatisfaction, the Kremlin has launched a series of measures aimed at consolidating Russia’s authoritarian political system. Will they work?
If Russia and China study each other’s legislation, it’s purely out of practical considerations for the purposes of doing business and protecting the interests of their own nationals.
Moscow knows that the United States’ main concern is the military rapprochement of Moscow and Beijing, in particular anything resembling a military alliance. It’s likely no coincidence that Putin touched on this sore point in recent comments.
The Belarusian revolution is far from over, and there are at least three scenarios in which the EU and Russia won’t be able to keep their differences over Belarus from escalating from the current moderate competition into an open geopolitical crisis like that seen in Ukraine.
President Biden will challenge the Kremlin both domestically and geopolitically. To thwart that dual challenge, Russia needs to deal with its numerous vulnerabilities effectively before its adversary is able to exploit them.
What action the Russian authorities take largely depends on the early actions and statements of the Biden administration. If Biden’s team shows a rational approach to possible areas of cooperation, that will at the very least delay any large-scale anti-American propaganda campaign.
Under Donald Trump, U.S.-Russian relations hit rock bottom and a record number of sanctions were imposed against Russia. Will a Biden administration bring change for better or worse?
Europe’s policy should start with a clear identification of those elements of Sino-Russian cooperation that are detrimental for EU’s interests and that whose direction it can influence.
The relationship between Russia and the United States will remain one of fierce rivalry, and that paradigm is unlikely to change. New political crises are possible, and will bring with them more sanctions.
Sanctions are becoming a form of economic regulation in this era of new protectionism. By virtue of its unique position in the world, the United States has the most opportunities to exercise this kind of regulation in its own interests.
Biden calls Russia the biggest threat to the United States, and sees Moscow’s policies as aimed at weakening Western countries internally; undermining the unity of such institutions as NATO and the European Union; and subverting the liberal world order.
President Sandu’s key imperative will be to foster a functional majority in parliament that produces a reformist government. But the current parliamentary configuration is not conducive to a major reforms push.
In the event of a managed transition of power in the next year or so, it’s military men who will supervise that transition and help to select a successor—who looks increasingly likely to be one of them.
Simultaneous crises in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kyrgyzstan have demonstrated Russia’s maturing approach to its neighborhood. Russia is learning to mind its limitations; to repel residual nostalgia; and to think straight, putting issues before personalities, and staying focused on its own interests, leaving the empire farther and farther behind.
The November 10 agreement could turn out to be a rapidly assembled construction that is not sustainable. Moscow may need wider international support to make it work.
The protest in Russia is becoming increasingly anti-Putin, as the example of Khabarovsk shows. From all flanks, left and right, not specifically liberal.
Even simply halting the collapse of the arms control system would be an achievement, albeit a temporary calm before the storm. After all, even if the New START treaty is extended, it expires in 2026.