Under Donald Trump, U.S.-Russian relations hit rock bottom and a record number of sanctions were imposed against Russia. Will a Biden administration bring change for better or worse?
Europe’s policy should start with a clear identification of those elements of Sino-Russian cooperation that are detrimental for EU’s interests and that whose direction it can influence.
The relationship between Russia and the United States will remain one of fierce rivalry, and that paradigm is unlikely to change. New political crises are possible, and will bring with them more sanctions.
Sanctions are becoming a form of economic regulation in this era of new protectionism. By virtue of its unique position in the world, the United States has the most opportunities to exercise this kind of regulation in its own interests.
Biden calls Russia the biggest threat to the United States, and sees Moscow’s policies as aimed at weakening Western countries internally; undermining the unity of such institutions as NATO and the European Union; and subverting the liberal world order.
President Sandu’s key imperative will be to foster a functional majority in parliament that produces a reformist government. But the current parliamentary configuration is not conducive to a major reforms push.
In the event of a managed transition of power in the next year or so, it’s military men who will supervise that transition and help to select a successor—who looks increasingly likely to be one of them.
Simultaneous crises in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kyrgyzstan have demonstrated Russia’s maturing approach to its neighborhood. Russia is learning to mind its limitations; to repel residual nostalgia; and to think straight, putting issues before personalities, and staying focused on its own interests, leaving the empire farther and farther behind.
The November 10 agreement could turn out to be a rapidly assembled construction that is not sustainable. Moscow may need wider international support to make it work.
The protest in Russia is becoming increasingly anti-Putin, as the example of Khabarovsk shows. From all flanks, left and right, not specifically liberal.
Even simply halting the collapse of the arms control system would be an achievement, albeit a temporary calm before the storm. After all, even if the New START treaty is extended, it expires in 2026.
The Republican and Democratic candidates have fundamentally opposite views on developing the energy sector, but whoever wins—and for different reasons—it won't be good news for Russia’s oil and gas industry.
Biden’s rhetorical support for the region will make it easier for Central Asian and South Caucasus governments to bring their issues to Washington's attention. But a Biden administration may not have the bandwidth to take on many new problems.
Even a partial restoration of transatlantic unity under a President Biden will be a blow to the official Kremlin narrative about the inexorable movement of the international system toward a polycentric world order.
The Kremlin’s agenda on the Korean Peninsula depends on a fundamental choice that must be made in Russian foreign policy: will the Kremlin strengthen its support for China in its global confrontation with the United States, or will it try to avoid getting embroiled in the conflict, thus retaining greater strategic autonomy in Asia and the rest of the world?
To anyone who has followed U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy for the past four years—and especially the last two years—of the Trump administration, the answer will be unambiguously “yes.”
Russia needs to restore, rather than erase, the memory of the millions of victims of totalitarianism and cease putting it in competition with the memory of those who fell in battle in World War II.
Podcast host Alex Gabuev and Myong-Hyun Go, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, examine the situation on the Korean Peninsula and possible impact there of the U.S. presidential election.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. It was initially a civil war that gradually evolved into an international conflict, during which the Soviet Union and China supported North Korea.
Sadyr Japarov’s meteoric rise was fueled by a fortunate combination of two political assets: popular radical rhetoric, and connections with influential people. But it’s unlikely they can both be juggled for long. One of them will have to be sacrificed.