Carnegie Moscow Center
Although many today may doubt the effectiveness of his policies, because of Eduard Shevardnadze Georgia has a set of options today, being in a position that in no way resembles the reality a generation ago.
In recent years Georgia has taken every possible step to ensure that its western trajectory does not threaten to Russia. Georgia is seeking a constructive role, consistent with its values and in tune with its geography.
There are few if any reasons for Russia to worry about an immediate negative impact on trade and economic interests of signing of the AA/DCFTA by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The Russian government’s position is more likely to reflect concerns about the loss of geopolitical influence rather than trade and economic relations.
The roots of the insurgency in the North Caucasus remain: local muslims, especially in Dagestan, still experience rule by Moscow as brutal and corrupt and feel they have no stake in Russian society. These roots are only likely to get deeper as Russia becomes more autocratic.
With the conflict reaching Iraq, which reflects to the same religious divisions as in Azerbaijan, the risk is greater that Azerbaijanis Shia and Sunnites will be affected by the sectarianism of the Middle East.
An exertion of soft power by stealth is Russia's best chance of re-establishing influence in Georgia. And its only chance of success is if the new economic relationship between the EU and Georgia fails to deliver results.
The coup d’état in Abkhazia attracted virtually no media attention in Russia, and even less attention was paid to the parliamentary election in South Ossetia. It seems that after almost six years of Abkhazian and South Ossetian “independence,” these territories stopped being Russia’s headache, only to be replaced by Crimea.
Local elections in Georgia demonstrated that less than two years after taking office the Georgian Dream has shed a large section of its support.
Azerbaijan has picked a fight with the U.S. government. The simplest explanation for this may be that President Aliyev is as paranoid and isolated as their actions suggest. If United States want to maintain influence in Azerbaijan it should find messengers who can get through some thick palace walls.
On June 1 Abkhaz President Alexander Ankvab was forced to resign. The next Abkhaz leader will rule a state that most of the world does not regard as legitimate. He will also struggle to win the same legitimacy at home as his predecessors enjoyed.