No doubt, the history of Turkey knows many exclusionist approaches (the case of the Kurdish movement is an evident example). Such approaches were on the table in the case of the Taksim movement. Yet finally Ankara has chosen inclusive response to the Taksim challenge. The cancelation of the Artillery Barracks project which had trigged the unrest is a symbol of this response.

As the protests are serious and give the impression that they will last, there is a risk of fissuring for the Justice and Development Party, especially since some of the prime minister’s allies have already expressed their reservations concerning his approach to the crisis.

Capitalizing on the good weather, Russia hands from around the world come to pay their visits and hear “what Russia thinks.” The questions they are asking could be sometimes more interesting that the answers they get.

It is common these days to talk about a rise of middle class revolts against their governments’ lack of respect for the citizens or their paternalistic practices. The main question remains: what makes such outbursts of civic sentiments successful and how one defines success?

The Turkish protests have become a sort of a response to the Arab Spring. While in the Arab world the Islamism has gained strength, its moderate Turkish version has suffered a serious blow.

The latest clashes and Erdogan’s crackdown in response reinforce a view in Armenia that the current Turkish prime minister is someone they cannot do business with. A reshuffling of the Turkish cards end up with Abdullah Gul as prime minister and re-championing a normalization with Armenia is not impossible.

Both the causes and nature of the Russian and Turkish protests, as well as the two regimes’ reactions to them, are strikingly similar. Despite the criticism leveled at Putin and Erdogan, the protests in both countries are not threatening the principles that support the system and the state—yet.

If the EU’s ambition were to be a mere trading bloc, it should be able to accommodate Turkey. If the Union, however, also aspires to be a political player, the rising power Turkey will hardly fit. The EU’s strategy must ensure that former Ottoman possessions in the Balkans eventually become part of Europe. As to Turkey, it should be turned into Europe’s close partner.

The segregation of technical and political issues in the dialogue with Iran could create a positive atmosphere for its acceleration. The main goal of the dialogue ought to be full transparency of Iran’s nuclear program. Suggesting more ambitious goals will lead this dialogue to nowhere and finally allow Iran to become a virtual nuclear weapon state.

In the foreseeable future, Iran’s neighbors, partners, and adversaries will have to deal with an Iran which is more united internally, more flexible at the tactical level, but strategically as determined as ever to be the dominant regional player. With Rowhani as president, it will be more difficult to present the Iranian leadership as irrational or unreasonable.

Iran’s foreign policy was deadlocked by the efforts of the former president—the radical and eccentric Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rowhani, who is dubbed “the sheikh of diplomacy” in Iran, will have to act both cautiously and decisively in correcting the errors of his predecessor and setting new trends.

With Hassan Rowhani as president of Iran, the Caucasus countries will still be pulled between Iran and the West. But they will be better placed to make the argument that their Iran policies are a case of positive cultural diplomacy.

Iranian system resembles Russian matryoshka–doll—you open one doll and there is another inside. The first matryoshka—the regime embodied by the presidency—is the subject for beating and for doing unpleasant things. Inside the shell is the real power—the authority of the Supreme Leader.

The international community is most interested in the foreign policy implications of the Iranian election. The combination of Rowhani in Tehran and Obama at the White House looks fortunate for diplomacy and peace. The reality will clearly be more complicated.

The G8 stands as a monument to unfulfilled promises and expectations of Russia’s integration into the West and its transformation along Western standards.

Indian newspapers did not pay much attention to the G8 Summit. Yet some reflections on two of the issues raised at the summit can be found in the Indian mass media. The first issue was Syria which clouded the G8 Summit. The second issue was related to tax evasion and lack of business transparency.

There is a wide scope for policy coordination amongst the leading economic and military powers on a global level. In this sense, the “G8 plus Five” format maybe more relevant at this point in time, given a “transition” in global governance.

That the final communiqué was signed by all the G8 members can hardly delude anyone: the disagreements between Russia and the other Seven look deeper than ever.

The annual G8 summit has been the occasion in recent years for a statement by three presidents on the often ignored conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. This year, it looks more like a “statement for the sake of a statement” or, more crudely, an affirmation that “the Minsk Group is not dead.”

G8 Summits reflect two things: firstly, the ungrounded hopes of the 1990s, and the lack of understanding at that time where Russia was heading; and secondly, the inability of the West to find an alternative forum to interact with Russia—one that is not dependent on the idea of a Russian democracy.