The program covers a broad spectrum of foreign policy and security issues, including Russia’s relations with the U.S. and Western Europe, the creation of a common Euro-Atlantic security system, Russia’s cooperation with its neighbors, the evolving relationship with Central and Eastern Europe, and the development of ties with China, Japan and other Asian powers.
Berlin is ending the era launched by Gorbachev of a trusting and friendly relationship with Moscow. Russia, for its part, no longer expects anything from Germany, and therefore does not feel obliged to take into account its opinion or interests.
The coronavirus pandemic has hastened the arrival of a new era of bipolarity. The short essays in this panoramic collection examine the various implications of the pandemic for Russia’s foreign relations.
Dmitri Trenin, D. B. Venkatesh Varma, Timofey Borisov, Rajesh Bansal, Lydia Kulik, Nivedita Kapoor, Samir Saran, Nandan Unnikrishnan
June 26, 2020
Is there a way to upgrade Indo-Russian economic and technological ties and make geopolitical and security interaction more effective, while not upending India’s connections with the United States, and Russia’s with China?
John Bolton suggests that Putin can play Trump like a fiddle. The truth is that under the forty-fifth U.S. president, the bilateral relationship with Russia is now as bad as at any time since the early 1980s.
To avoid becoming part of a Sino-centric power bloc and maintain international equilibrium, which is critically important to Russia’s status and self-image, Moscow must reduce its dependence on China by fostering its relations with other large economic and financial players: primarily European countries, India, and Japan.
The longer-term consequences of the coronavirus will include the further intensification of U.S.-Chinese rivalry, and the emerging Sino-American bipolarity. Russia’s top priority should be to carefully maintain equilibrium—though not equidistance—between the United States and China.