Carnegie Moscow Center
The U.S.-Iran crisis of January 2020 did not lead to a major war in the Middle East, but it did reveal a number of new trends reshaping the world order.
The world is probably entering a period of new bipolarity, in which the main players will be the United States and China. The situation will prompt various states to address the question of how they relate to the new central axis of global rivalry, this time between Washington and Beijing.
Russia and China’s strategic military cooperation is becoming ever closer. President Putin has announced that Russia is helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches.
Russia is back and here to stay. Others had better accept it and learn to deal with it — without undue expectations, but also without inordinate fear.
America’s withdrawal creates an opportunity and a challenge for Moscow.
Today it makes sense to examine Putin’s legacy in practical regard, through the prism of certain questions: What is of abiding importance and should be preserved for the next generation of Russian leaders? What needs to be changed and developed? What should be best avoided in the future?
The China-Russian military cooperation with its underlying strategic calculus is clearly aimed at countering US moves and capabilities in the region.
Russia’s brand of exceptionalism is not messianic. It is rooted in the isolation of an Orthodox country and its belief that it possesses the gift of a true religious faith. It has been strengthened by Russia’s successful—if costly—defense of its state sovereignty, and confirmed by Russia’s status as a major global player that refuses to take orders from anyone.
Russian history is a controversial and hotly debated subject, both at home and abroad. Distilling its lessons is difficult, but worthwhile, as many themes from Russia’s past are likely to endure well into its post-Putin future.
China and Russia have learned lessons from history: great powers lead or abstain, they don’t jump on the bandwagons of others, and in bilateral relations, great powers seek to maintain equilibrium-they may come close to each other if interests or circumstances demand, but not so close as to become followers.