On the eve of regional elections, the authorities have responded to protesters' demands for a more competitive and transparent political process by employing ever more sophisticated tricks to retain their hold on power.
Inter-religious and interethnic relations are rapidly deteriorating in Russia, but the authorities lack the programs to cope with them, the mechanisms to create new programs, and the realization that both are urgently needed.
The Kremlin's proposed anti-corruption campaign will serve to bind the bureaucracy together in order to avoid disloyalty, with the main goal of redistributing the wealth of the elites among their members.
The Kremlin is implementing counterproductive changes in relations between Moscow and the regions that offer little promise of improving the situation in the country.
Liberating itself from an authoritarian regime and overcoming internal differences is a formidable task for any nation, but outside intervention hardly makes it easier.
The current three filter system for gubernatorial elections not only aggravates the opposition and fails to vent mounting social pressure, but it also strengthens the position of incumbent governors.
A new bill introduced to change the way the Federation Council is formed ostensibly allows voters to express their will but actually shields those in power from accountability to the electorate.
For many, the draft statute for the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East signals the possible reform of the entire system of state administration, but all signs point to little real change.
The Kremlin is unlikely to be able to manage gubernatorial elections the way it might wish, as it becomes increasingly difficult for Moscow to manage the democratic process at the regional level.
The Russian political system is likely to undergo some changes this year, perhaps even serious ones—not because Putin wants them, but because elements of Putin's inner circle are convinced that the government must take some of the protesters' demands seriously.