Carnegie Moscow Center
Introducing visas and closing borders with Central Asian countries should not be the first steps in solving the problem of ethnic hatred in Russia. Instead, there should come a transformation of the entire Russian state, a regime change, and a resolution of the problem of the North Caucasus.
The negotiations on a grand coalition in the Bundestag between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic Party are underway, and it is not even clear who will be responsible for the foreign policy. Meanwhile, the current German policy on Russia, which has not changed regardless of who the chancellor may have been, can be summed up as follows, “Berlin must not irritate the Kremlin.”
The values put forward by Putin are not traditional values, but rather their imitations. These false offerings can only discredit the new values of freedom, solidarity, and mutual help that are taking root among some segments of the Russian population.
The Ukrainian elite has reached consensus on what it does not want—it does not want to be suffocated by the Kremlin’s embrace. For Putin the growing readiness of Ukraine to turn to Europe despite the formidable costs of this decision is a real disaster: his Eurasian Union cannot be a serious entity without the second large Slavic state limping along.
If 1991 opened opportunities for Russia, including a path toward a rule-of-law state and an open society, 1993 closed all options except one: a new system of personalized power.
The October elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia seem to mean different things for those two countries. In Azerbaijan, there is a continuity of Aliev rule that is moving toward sultanism. In Georgia, one could observe the end of one epoch and the beginning of another.
Merkel’s rule, apparently, means a break in Germany’s life due to the lack of new political elites and leaders.
Merkel’s leadership is made up of a whole series of anti-leader qualities: attempts to put off needed decisions, not wanting to take responsibility, an emphasis on pragmatism, privatizing opponents’ ideas, and refusing to set a clear foreign policy line.
The authorities took a new approach in the Moscow election by allowing opposition candidate Navalny to participate without the possibility of winning. But Navalny won a moral victory and became an opposition leader with a national reputation.
The West and the United States should revisit their policy toward Russia and attempt to find an approach that goes beyond cynical deal-making and false friendship.