Despite the trauma of Armenia’s defeat in the recent Karabakh war, protests against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been underwhelming. He may not have lived up to expectations, but few believe his rivals could offer a significantly better future.
A bloody six-week war in Nagorno-Karabakh is over, after a peace agreement brokered by Moscow was signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As the dust settles, Azerbaijan appears to be the clear winner, while Armenia has suffered a bitter defeat. There are, however, two other powers that have benefited from the conflict and the resolution effort: Turkey and Russia.
The second Karabakh War is seemingly over, and as one side celebrates and another mourns, experts, opinion makers and their ilk are trying to gauge what the Kremlin-brokered, Erdogan-approved truce might bring. How will the power balance change in the region, who are the winners and losers, and, finally, what impact will it have on Georgia? These are the topics GEORGIA TODAY put to one of the Moscow Carnegie Center's most prominent faces, Dmitri Trenin.
The November 10 agreement could turn out to be a rapidly assembled construction that is not sustainable. Moscow may need wider international support to make it work.
Biden’s rhetorical support for the region will make it easier for Central Asian and South Caucasus governments to bring their issues to Washington's attention. But a Biden administration may not have the bandwidth to take on many new problems.
With no end in sight to the renewed fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, this episode of the Carnegie Moscow Center English-language podcast focuses on the roles of Russia and Turkey in the conflict.
Russia may have reasons to help its ally Armenia, but it has no reason at all to punish Azerbaijan, which has been an example of model behavior among the former Soviet states, as far as Russia is concerned.
The Europeans and Americans may groan about this faraway conflict in the hills of the Caucasus, but they will ultimately have to engage with it more seriously—and in partnership with Russia, whatever their differences on other issues.
The most likely scenario amid renewed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a battle for small and not particularly important pockets of land, allowing for the symbolic declaration of a victory. But raising the bar in a conflict makes it very difficult to stop as planned.
It’s in neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan’s interests for Russia to pick a side in their conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh would go from being a unique place where Russia and the West cooperate to yet another theater for their rivalry, with all the ensuing risks and dangers.