• Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Rule by KPI: The Kremlin’s New Approach to Governing Russia

    At a time when the regime’s approval ratings are declining and discontent is growing, the Kremlin has embraced a new approach to governing Russia, best described as a fusion of Soviet and corporate managerial approaches. Championed by the presidential administration’s Sergei Kiriyenko, it has made the authorities look and act a lot like a corporation—for better and worse. On the one hand, they now invest more time and resources in training politicians and government officials, having them participate in brainstorming sessions and play business simulations; but ordinary Russians are still treated with contempt, dangerously widening the gulf between state and citizen.

    • Op-Ed

    Will the Kerch Blockade Make Putin Great Again?

    The narrative that Russia is under attack has long dominated Kremlin propaganda, with Vladimir Putin positioning himself as the commander of a fortress besieged. But Putin's latest attempt to "remind" Russians that they are being attacked is unlikely to work.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    How the Kremlin Ceded Control Over Russia’s Social Agenda

    Amid painful economic choices, political elites and government officials in Russia are growing distant from the public. Meanwhile, the mainstream media’s coverage of social issues is becoming increasingly alarmist, a sign that the Kremlin is losing control over Russia’s social agenda. With its response to social issues a mix of contempt and indifference, it seems that the government’s new maxim and the defining principle of Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term is “the state doesn’t owe you anything.”

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    The Illusion of Control: The Kremlin Prepares for Falling Ratings

    However resilient the Putin regime might look to an outsider, it isn’t ready and isn’t preparing itself for a possible decline in its popularity ratings, which may unleash consequences beyond the fall of individual governors and the ruling United Russia party. The Kremlin doesn’t believe that Vladimir Putin and the Russian regime as a whole could become unpopular, so it considers the current decline in support for the government to be a natural and manageable outcome of the recent increase in the retirement age.

    • Quick Take

    Is Putin Less Popular?

    Is Putin losing his touch? A new poll suggests that pension reform has damaged his approval ratings.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Why Russia’s Crimean Consensus Is Over (And What Comes Next)

    The largest coalition of support for the Russian regime in modern history is over. Due to the fusion of the ruling elite and business, the Russian authorities have no one left to blame for poverty and falling standards of living besides themselves. But the government may have one last trick up its sleeve: repression.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Russia’s Youtube Duel: Zolotov vs. Navalny

    Viktor Zolotov’s video message to Alexei Navalny—a crude and highly personal address for an influential national security official—underscores the increasing incoherence of the authorities’ strategy for dealing with Navalny. More important, it points to the emergence of a state of “every man for himself” and the splintering of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Why Putin Is Losing Popular Support

    The approval ratings of Russia’s leaders and its institutions have been declining for more than three years. The erosion of popular support has been accelerated, rather than caused, by the unveiling of the government’s pension reform plan, and Russians are increasingly concerned by the state of not only their pensions but also their country’s foreign policy and its economy

    • Op-Ed

    Saving Colonel Putin: Why Russia’s Pension Reform Just Got More Expensive

    Putin’s formula for pension reform might allow him to stem his political losses. Even if his ratings don’t grow, they might at least stop falling. But the cost of saving Colonel Putin will turn out to be exorbitantly high for the budget and the economy.

    • Carnegie.ru Commentary

    Russia’s Empty Throne: Why Putin Manufactures Political Uncertainty

    The less specific presidential orders are, the greater the speculation about what Putin actually wants done. This deliberate vagueness allows the president to see more clearly both the new power balance and the political material he will have to deal with in the next six years.

Carnegie Experts on
Putinology

  • expert thumbnail - Baunov
    Alexander Baunov
    Senior Fellow
    Editor in Chief of Carnegie.ru
    Moscow Center
    Baunov is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor in chief of Carnegie.ru.
  • expert thumbnail - Gaaze
    Konstantin Gaaze
    Nonresident Scholar
    Carnegie Moscow Center
    Konstantin Gaaze is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
  • expert thumbnail - Kolesnikov
    Andrei Kolesnikov
    Senior Fellow and Chair
    Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program
    Moscow Center
    Kolesnikov is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
  • expert thumbnail - Movchan
    Andrey Movchan
    Nonresident Scholar
    Economic Policy Program
    Moscow Center
    Movchan is a nonresident scholar in the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
  • expert thumbnail - Samorukov
    Maxim Samorukov
    Deputy Editor of Carnegie.ru
    Moscow Center
    Samorukov is deputy editor of Carnegie.ru.

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