Carnegie Moscow Center
Nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security only in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without them, deterrence fuels an endless arms race, while any serious crisis between the great powers will bring them to the brink of nuclear war.
Traditionally, Moscow has insisted on arms control agreements being enshrined in legally binding documents, while Washington has been more open to political deals. Nevertheless, a new, more flexible approach could find support with the Russian leadership.
Strategic stability has fundamentally changed in the twenty-first century. To maintain or even strengthen it requires many long-standing ideas and policies to be rethought and overhauled.
Carnegie Europe and the Carnegie Moscow Center organized a roundtable to discuss the changing nature and shifting trends of global strategic stability in the post-arms control era.
Despite their troubles, Europe and the US are not withering away. It would behoove Moscow to avoid escalations.
Russia’s concerns that U.S. missile defense and hypersonic missiles threaten its nuclear arsenal are overstated, but the deterioration of arms control treaties has profound negative implications.
Rosneft’s deep ties to Venezuela and Russia’s efforts to insert itself into the crisis there together raise questions about whether the country’s leadership is acting to preserve national or corporate and private interests.
The impact of cyberweapons on strategic stability is a growing problem that extends well beyond the security of the control and communication systems of nuclear forces.
There will be many issues at play when the Russian and U.S. presidents meet at the G20 leaders’ summit in Buenos Aires. Our Russia experts provide insight into the Kremlin’s game plan.
The Zimbabweans understand that the Russians will not be able to convert the results of their assistance into direct political or economic power, and even the simple monetization of influence is not yet being discussed. Therefore, they willingly accept any form of support from Moscow. Russia, for its part, still lacks the experience, information, and human resources to compete in Africa with the former colonial powers or China. It can, however, comfortably play a role that requires significantly fewer resources: that of a restraining and independent power.