The nomination of Mullah Fazlullah as the new head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) does not seem to dramatically change prospects for an agreement between the TTP and Islamabad. Yet if signed, this agreement will not be able to stop violence in the tribal area of Pakistan and neighbor regions.
Introducing visas and closing borders with Central Asian countries should not be the first steps in solving the problem of ethnic hatred in Russia. Instead, there should come a transformation of the entire Russian state, a regime change, and a resolution of the problem of the North Caucasus.
The impact of Pakistan on the situation in Afghanistan is seriously overestimated. Current problems and future risks will not allow Pakistan even to think about the decisive influence in Afghanistan.
After the U.S. troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban will most likely regain the power under the auspices of Pakistan and possibly of another neighbor—China.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 equates with an unquestionable strengthening of the Taliban movement or even with its actual coming to power. The external actors will have to adjust to the new situation and the future Afghan coalition leadership which will include the Taliban.
In the run-up to 2014, when the U.S./NATO combat forces due to leave Afghanistan, fears multiply that a major extremist threat is rising again for the neighborhood and beyond. Russia is right to focus on the southern flank as far as its most pressing security needs are concerned.
After 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan experienced several crises, including the 1999, 2002, and 2008 events. They have already agreed on some confidence-building measures, though unverified. Do India and Pakistan need a more dangerous crisis to start arms control talks and negotiations on verification mechanisms?
Next to maintaining a strict balance between two former overlords, Beijing and Moscow, Ulan Bator seeks to balance its both physical neighbors with a third—virtual—one.