For the foreseeable future, Russian-Chinese relations are likely to be closer, and more productive than Russian-American ones. This is not based on emotions, but on national interests.
Alexander Gabuev is joined by Dmitri Trenin and Elena Chernenko to discuss what impact the global pandemic has had—and will continue to have—on Russian foreign policy.
John Bolton suggests that Putin can play Trump like a fiddle. The truth is that under the forty-fifth U.S. president, the bilateral relationship with Russia is now as bad as at any time since the early 1980s.
As long as the Kosovo dispute remains a make-or-break factor in Serbian politics, every Serbian government will need an open door in Moscow.
The longer-term consequences of the coronavirus will include the further intensification of U.S.-Chinese rivalry, and the emerging Sino-American bipolarity. Russia’s top priority should be to carefully maintain equilibrium—though not equidistance—between the United States and China.
The coronavirus pandemic is another opportunity that Moscow is using to engage Washington in an attempt to break through the logjams in their relationship.
In recent decades Russia has been too focused on the United States. On the eve of the third decade of the 21st century Russians should arm themselves with patience, set their eyes on the domestic affairs, and establish smooth and balanced relations with far stronger China.
Those looking at Russia’s foreign relations would soon discover that the country is essentially a loner. It is not part of any international large family, whether Europe, the Atlantic community or the West. Asians do not recognize Russia as Asian, either.
Russia’s relations with the West are not about to get any better.
While broadly perceived as a blow to the EU and its values, Brexit will actually benefit a future democratic Russia. Britain’s exit will create a new model of Europeanness, in which a country can strive to achieve European standards without EU membership. That is a niche Russia can fill.