Carnegie Moscow Center
Since the collapse of the Cold War order many countries around the world have engaged in wars and revolutions. The outcomes of these battles no longer fit in the good-or-evil framework. What’s more, in today’s disorderly and erratic world even major nations do not have the authority to make such judgments.
In 2013, Poland got a chance to position itself as a major player within the EU, although “its” Eastern Partnership initiative did not fulfill the expectations. In 2014, Warsaw’s foreign policy—if conducted correctly—could be great for Poland from the image perspective.
The protesters in Kiev have a real chance of ushering in a more democratic system. If taking sides with them means taking a stance against Russia’s Vladimir Putin, so be it.
Russia’s Constitution is the main guarantee and instrument for keeping Russia’s authoritarianism in place. Constitutional reform that will ensure political competition should become the foundation for political reform in general and for opening up Russia’s system of government.
Nation-building in Ukraine is a formidable task, its divided nation also a hurdle to a democratic development. Still, Ukraine seems to have a better chance of evolving as a democracy than Russia.
The problem with the nation-building effort in Russia is that a nation cannot be built from above. Unless people begin treating their state as their own, Russia will continue to be a country and a state, but no nation.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who was the first Polish non-communist prime minister, died on October 28. He will be remembered as a Man Who Helped to Open a New Era—and not only for Poland.
The values put forward by Putin are not traditional values, but rather their imitations. These false offerings can only discredit the new values of freedom, solidarity, and mutual help that are taking root among some segments of the Russian population.
Western Europeans should watch Central Europe carefully. Its obsessions should not be dismissed lightly, and its ambitions make good historical, political, and economic sense.
If 1991 opened opportunities for Russia, including a path toward a rule-of-law state and an open society, 1993 closed all options except one: a new system of personalized power.