Carnegie Moscow Center
Ukraine needs more than the current level of Western assistance. But the Ukrainian government also needs to pull its weight, promising (and delivering) transparency.
According to this year’s Transatlantic Trends survey, Russians have an increasingly unfavorable view of the United States and the EU. Americans and Europeans also had more negative outlooks toward Russia in 2014 than previous years.
Ukraine’s political heat wave will last well into the coming fall and winter—unless Ukraine, the West, and Russia change their current course.
The Kremlin now sees the U.S. goal as the toppling of the Putin regime. That said, expecting Putin to back off betrays a lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation. It is no longer just a struggle for Ukraine, but a battle for Russia.
Russia could use the U.S.-led sanctions to begin its long-delayed re-industrialization and to start building a modern economy.
There are few if any reasons for Russia to worry about an immediate negative impact on trade and economic interests of signing of the AA/DCFTA by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The Russian government’s position is more likely to reflect concerns about the loss of geopolitical influence rather than trade and economic relations.
The initiatives outlined by Putin in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum may lay the groundwork for radical changes in economic policy.
The first three months of U.S.-led sanctions did not cause yet deep-seated problems for Russian economy. Regardless, the stakes for Russia are very high. Like the proverbial ancient warrior, it is standing at a crossroads now.
The crisis in Ukraine may lead to unpredictable consequences inside Russia—from another perestroika to complete collapse.
After the end of the Cold War, the West neglected the task of solving the “Russia problem” through integration. Trying to solve it now through economic warfare is not going to work.