Carnegie Moscow Center
This year media publications, state visits, and lofty declarations implied an unprecedented boom in Russian-North Korean relations. However, official 2014 statistics paint a different picture
In recent years, North Korea has transformed from one of the least to one of the most corrupt countries in East Asia. But this has been a blessing for its people, both politically and economically
Under Kim Jong-un, the repressions against the North Korean elite have reached unprecedented levels since the times of the inter-faction strife of the 1950’s. Such methods of shoring up one’s power may backfire
Kim Jong-un eagerly and easily communicates with foreigners, but at the same time avoids meeting foreign heads of state. After three years in power he has never once met with a single one of his foreign colleagues.
Unlike Tehran, Pyongyang fears external threats more than internal ones and may at most agree to freeze its nuclear program. Though this scenario is arguably the best one imaginable, political considerations in Washington make it all but impossible.
Due to his age, young Kim Jong-un cannot afford to rule the way his aged father did. The old system will not guarantee him another 40—50 years in power. Therefore, he is forced to change it, however risky these changes might be.
By reactivating its policy on Pyongyang, Moscow is sending messages to Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, and Beijing, which should be properly understood.
Tension on the Korean Peninsula has increased since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011. To prevent destabilization, Moscow needs to pursue a more active Korea policy.
Russia’s economic, political and strategic environment in the West is fast deteriorating. One obvious way to respond to this is to reach out to Asia and the Pacific.
There have been many events in Asia in 2013. But some of them stand to impact the most the global policy and security in 2014.