Carnegie Moscow Center
In the past 20 years, there has been a major, and positive, turnaround in the Russo-Turkish bilateral relationship.
Although Russians are closely watching the demonstrations and regime changes taking place across the Middle East and North Africa, it is the situation in Central Asia that is more likely to affect Russia in the long run.
In spite of the massive popular protests that have swept away two Arab strongmen and shaken half a dozen monarchies and republics, the Arab world has yet to witness any fundamental change in ruling elites and even less in the nature of governance.
If the United States offers assistance for the development of political parties to Egypt, such aid should go to all legal parties, potentially including the Muslim Brotherhood, or Washington risks undermining U.S. credibility as a pro-democratic actor.
To effectively counter terrorism, civil societies and NGOs in both Russia and India must work alongside their governments while working to avoid alienating the significant Muslim minorities in each country.
Moscow puts a high priority on its relations with India, which complicates Russia’s relationship with Pakistan.
The dispute over the South Kuril Islands complicates Russo-Japanese relations, but domestic political circumstances in both countries undermine the possibility of a negotiated diplomatic solution.
Egypt has been fundamentally changed by the events since Jan. 25, and the challenge now is to translate the changes flowing from the popular uprising into the concrete procedures and safeguards necessary for a genuine transition to democracy.
Moscow’s reaction to the current upheaval in Egypt demonstrates the dramatically changed nature of Russian relations with, and presence in, the Middle East.
The failure of the international community to recognize the Caucasus and Central Asia as a region with complex internal dynamics complicates efforts to respond to global challenges ranging from energy security and arms proliferation to humanitarian crises.