Carnegie Moscow Center
Russian liberals are increasingly critical of the West as Western countries pursue a pragmatic foreign policy that often helps the Kremlin legitimize its rule.
A flexible relationship, rather than an alliance, may better suit Russia and China despite their many shared interests.
The Kremlin is unlikely to be able to manage gubernatorial elections the way it might wish, as it becomes increasingly difficult for Moscow to manage the democratic process at the regional level.
Putin's return to the Kremlin may well act as an accelerator for revolution, because it means that the logic of personalized power will continue to stand in the way of regime change.
Each of the three previous four-year presidential terms in Russia—two of Vladimir Putin and one Dmitry Medvedev’s—has been marked by a different policy toward the West, and the new Putin’s six-year period opening in 2012 is likely to follow that pattern.
The Russian political system is likely to undergo some changes this year, perhaps even serious ones—not because Putin wants them, but because elements of Putin's inner circle are convinced that the government must take some of the protesters' demands seriously.
Russia's Muslim community is divided, with much of its clergy fighting over leadership. This divide suits the Kremlin, which has no interest in a unified or strong Muslim minority.
Putin has returned to the Kremlin, but he faces a significantly different Russia, because the country's situation has changed drastically. The previous Putin’s consensus between those in power and society has fallen apart.
Putin’s surprising decision to skip the G8 summit means that he is putting the stability of his power structure above his diplomatic engagements abroad.
Putin's return to power reveals Medvedev's supposedly reformist presidency for the farce it really was. Medvedev's legacy in one sentence: He enabled Putin's personalized rule to continue unabated.