Carnegie Moscow Center
Information about the views of the Russian elite, a segment of the population that has grown increasingly guarded and circumspect during the 2000s, is hard to come by. Nevertheless, aggregate data analysis suggests some conclusions about key features of elite opinion following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russian public has embraced an increasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology.
In 2014, Russia broke out of the post–Cold War order and openly challenged the U.S.-led international system. Moscow’s new course is laid down first and foremost by President Vladimir Putin, but it also reflects the rising power of Russian nationalism.
Russia has stepped forward in Ukraine to protect its vital interests—which the West saw as aggression by a revisionist power. The ensuing conflict will last long and have an impact far beyond Europe.
After the end of the political protests of 2011–2012, Russia has found itself in a troubled break between two eras. This is a time of conservatism, which, in its Russian incarnation, has morphed into a gloomy, almost medieval archaism.
It is time for Moscow to rethink its approach to Central Asia.
More than any other European state, Germany is responsible for developing and implementing the EU’s policy toward Russia. Berlin needs to accept this responsibility, assume leadership, and develop a Russia policy fit for the twenty-first century.
The Eastern Partnership states and the EU have to acknowledge their own failures instead of playing a “blame game” and work together to make the partnership a success.
With revolutions across the Arab world, Russia’s chances for strengthening its position in the region look increasingly slim. The Kremlin must change course and ensure that its approach to the Middle East and Islamists reflects post–Arab Spring realities.
In order to develop an effective strategic approach toward Russia, Europeans must deepen their understanding of the changing Russian realities.