Carnegie Moscow Center
Turkey and the EU both face urgent foreign and security issues that cannot wait. As a result, they need a new, more effective channel for strategic dialogue to complement the accession process.
Despite the reset, a values gap still exists between Russia and the United States that could limit progress, undermine trust and confidence in the bilateral relationship, and raise difficult issues that cannot be ignored.
As NATO grapples with the future of its deterrence posture, it faces the contentious question of whether reducing or withdrawing forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would unacceptably reduce the security of its member states.
When NATO leaders convene in November, they will undertake a reexamination of the alliance’s policy on nuclear weapons, a review that, spurred by recent nonproliferation initiatives, could split NATO’s members if not handled carefully.
While there is virtually no hope that the 2009 Armenian–Turkish Protocols will be ratified soon, both parties should take steps to rebuild confidence and affirm their faith in the process.
The signing of the New START in April 2010 was a major step forward in building a legally binding, verifiable strategic arms reduction framework, but more action is necessary to overcome persistent mutual mistrust and bureaucratic obstacles hampering further force reductions.
While Russia’s short-term economy will largely depend on oil prices and the country’s demographic challenges, its medium-to-long-term outlook will be influenced by the lessons that leaders take from the crisis, which will affect Russia’s economic structure and policies for many years to come.
President Obama should assess whether any other leaders of major countries are seriously prepared to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world. If some are, he should invite them to join him in detailing a ten-year action plan to minimize the dangers posed by fissile materials and maximize the potential of peaceful nuclear energy.
Recent arguments against a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany are based on anachronistic perceptions regarding NATO’s nuclear weapons capacity, but bring up important points concerning broader implications for nuclear disarmament.
Russia's system of government administration is inefficient, unable to cope with both a transition of political power and the economic crisis at the same time. To ensure its own survival, the Russian regime must modernize itself.
Russian policy makers need to open space for public debate and engage in substantive discussions on critical global issues, and Western governments and institutions need to open the door to independent Russian voices.
The Obama administration’s decision to abandon plans to deploy a European ballistic missile defense system has helped sooth relations with Russia and provided an opportunity for U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense.
The Obama administration must engage in a new type of dialogue with the Middle East, one modeled after the process used to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, if it wants to have any chance of impacting political reform in the region.
Rules are the key to maintaining necessary pressure on Iran and framing a mutually-acceptable, face-saving outcome. Iran must take steps to build and maintain international confidence that all its nuclear activities are peaceful, and that none have military dimensions.
Despite the official end of Russia’s counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, armed clashes and terrorist attacks continue to plague North Caucasus. Open conflict is on the verge of becoming inevitable.
Islam alone will not aid Pakistan’s political development; instead, national stability will improve with better administrative, security, economic, and social services.
Until the United States, China, and the EU reach consensus about the roots of the global economic crisis and coordinate recovery policy, the world economy is likely to get worse before it gets better.
The Obama administration needs a new approach to the Caspian region that provides opportunities for local leaders to engage with the United States in economic and political development.
The debate in Washington and European capitals has recently centered on how many more troops will be sent to Afghanistan in 2009 as part of a military surge. The real question, however, is how combat troops should be used - to pursue the Taliban, or secure key areas to allow institutions to develop. The main policy objective must be the development of a government that can survive U.S. withdrawal.
Russia must aim for modernization and use its foreign policy to achieve rapprochement with Europe, North America and the economically and politically developed world at large.