Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence

Dmitri Trenin Op-Ed September 22, 2009 The Washington Quarterly
Summary
Russia retains interests throughout the post-Soviet regions, but Moscow’s considerable influence is no longer dominant.
Related Media and Tools
 
  • Email
In the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian war, President Dmitri Medvedev, setting out Russia’s foreign policy principles, spoke about the country’s spheres of “privileged interests” and the government’s obligation to defend Russian citizens abroad. Coming less than a month after Russia’s armed response to Georgia’s attack on its breakaway province of South Ossetia, where most residents had been provided with Russian passports, this statement produced a shock. It sounded as if Moscow was reclaiming the Soviet geopolitical legacy of Russia’s spheres of influence and was prepared to intervene with force in countries with significant ethnic Russian minorities. The talk of Russian assertiveness, making rounds since the mid-2000s, was substantially enhanced by accusations of Russia’s outright aggressive behavior. The year that followed has seen an unprecedented global financial and economic crisis, a new administration in Washington, and a decrease in tensions between Russia and the United States. The issues that had produced a near confrontation between the two—such as the United States’ single-minded support for President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia; Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; NATO’s membership action plans (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine; and plans to install U.S. ballistic missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland—while not completely off the table, are now clearly on the backburner.
 
Toward the end of 2008, however, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a wide-ranging statement, made a very strong case for the “unique relations” that bound Russia and the countries of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He spoke about “civilizational unity” of the lands that used to be the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and before that, the Russian empire. Thus, a question arose: what is the difference, if any, between the sphere of interests proclaimed by the current Russian leadership, and the more traditional sphere of influence condemned by international public opinion? What, after all, are Moscow’s motives and its aims?

 

Source: http://carnegie.ru/2009/09/22/russia-s-spheres-of-interest-not-influence/aivi

More from The Global Think Tank

In Fact

 

70%

of oil consumed in the United States

is for the transportation sector.

20%

of Chechnya’s pre-1994 population

has fled to different parts of the world.

58%

of oil consumed in China

was from foreign sources in 2012.

32

million cases pending

in India’s judicial system.

20

million people killed

in Cold War conflicts.

18%

of the U.S. economy

is consumed by healthcare.

$536

billion in goods and services

traded between the United States and China in 2012.

$100

billion in foreign investment and oil revenue

have been lost by Iran because of its nuclear program.

4700%

increase in China’s GDP per capita

between 1972 and today.

$11

billion have been spent

to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran.

2%

of Iran’s electricity needs

is all the Bushehr nuclear reactor provides.

82

new airports

are set to be built in China by 2015.

78

journalists

were imprisoned in Turkey as of August 2012 according to the OSCE.

67%

of the world's population

will reside in cities by 2050.

16

million Russian citizens

are considered “ethnic Muslims.”

Stay In The Know

Enter your email address in the field below to receive the latest Carnegie analysis in your inbox!

Personal Information
 
 
Carnegie Moscow Center
 
16/2 Tverskaya Moscow, 125009 Russia
Phone: +7 495 935-8904 Fax: +7 495 935-8906
Please note...

You are leaving the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy's website and entering another Carnegie global site.

请注意...

你将离开清华—卡内基中心网站,进入卡内基其他全球中心的网站。