Even simply halting the collapse of the arms control system would be an achievement, albeit a temporary calm before the storm. After all, even if the New START treaty is extended, it expires in 2026.

The Republican and Democratic candidates have fundamentally opposite views on developing the energy sector, but whoever wins—and for different reasons—it won't be good news for Russia’s oil and gas industry.

Biden’s rhetorical support for the region will make it easier for Central Asian and South Caucasus governments to bring their issues to Washington's attention. But a Biden administration may not have the bandwidth to take on many new problems.

Even a partial restoration of transatlantic unity under a President Biden will be a blow to the official Kremlin narrative about the inexorable movement of the international system toward a polycentric world order.

The Kremlin’s agenda on the Korean Peninsula depends on a fundamental choice that must be made in Russian foreign policy: will the Kremlin strengthen its support for China in its global confrontation with the United States, or will it try to avoid getting embroiled in the conflict, thus retaining greater strategic autonomy in Asia and the rest of the world?

To anyone who has followed U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy for the past four years—and especially the last two years—of the Trump administration, the answer will be unambiguously “yes.”

Podcast host Alex Gabuev and Myong-Hyun Go, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, examine the situation on the Korean Peninsula and possible impact there of the U.S. presidential election.

Sadyr Japarov’s meteoric rise was fueled by a fortunate combination of two political assets: popular radical rhetoric, and connections with influential people. But it’s unlikely they can both be juggled for long. One of them will have to be sacrificed.

Trump’s election made Russia a hostage of the battle raging in U.S. domestic politics. This time around, Biden’s victory wouldn’t be the worst thing for Russia.

The latest EU sanctions against Russia send a clear signal: it’s not enough for individuals to have liberal ideas and reformist intentions; those ideas and intentions must be noticeable in the actions of the Russian state.

With no end in sight to the renewed fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, this episode of the Carnegie Moscow Center English-language podcast focuses on the roles of Russia and Turkey in the conflict.

There’s no point in expecting anything like the Belarusian protests—not to mention the revolution in Kyrgyzstan—in Tajikistan. In the decades he has been at the helm, President Rahmon has concentrated all the power in the country in his own hands.

Russia may have reasons to help its ally Armenia, but it has no reason at all to punish Azerbaijan, which has been an example of model behavior among the former Soviet states, as far as Russia is concerned.

The situation in Kyrgyzstan is in some ways similar to the last two revolutions. At the heart of it is not the revolt of a liberal opposition against a corrupt regime, but a brutal fight for power between regional and tribal groups disguised as political parties. The difference this time is the reluctance of world and regional powers to get involved.

Despite occasional flurries of plans and activity, there is little chance of radical change in Russian-North Korean relations, and the bilateral problems are not the result of sanctions.

Putin’s spokesman’s vitriolic attack on opposition politician Alexei Navalny—calling him a CIA puppet and accusing him of insulting the president—is a continuation of attempts to marginalize Navalny amid his post-poisoning prominence.

Nearly two months after Belarus’s contested presidential election, Alexander Lukashenko continues to cling to power. This episode of the Carnegie Moscow Center English-language podcast examines how the situation there may unfold.

President Mirziyoyev has already solved the issues for which his predecessor Karimov was condemned. Now he must tackle the problems that have arisen on his own watch. With every year, it will be harder and harder to pass off symbolic concessions as genuine reforms.

The Europeans and Americans may groan about this faraway conflict in the hills of the Caucasus, but they will ultimately have to engage with it more seriously—and in partnership with Russia, whatever their differences on other issues.

For Zelensky’s team, used to winning landslide victories, the outcome of the upcoming local elections will be dispiriting and will fan the flames of internal strife.