Carnegie Moscow Center
To solve the problems of the North Caucasus, Moscow needs to stop the trend toward de-modernization and de-industrialization of the region, as well as to help raise local elites and support the closer integration with the rest of the Russian Federation.
Unlike in Russia, where organized crime persists in part because the government lacks the political will to enforce the law consistently, organized crime in the Caucasus has its roots in a larger cultural problem.
The mass unrest in Moscow this December has demonstrated the failure of the authorities to maintain stability in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country.
Abkhazia’s relationship with Russia and the larger international community is shaped both by its disputed status as an independent state and by a sharp historical memory of its equally disputed past.
While war is not likely to break out over Nagorno-Karabakh in the near future, there is a growing possibility that escalation in the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia could kill the peace process.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s central role in the country’s governance may leave Georgia ill-equipped to handle the growing economic challenges ahead.
The ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus stem more from the way the region was managed under the Soviet system than from any ethnic incompatibility or ancient hatreds among its inhabitants.
Russia’s North Caucasus is in the grip of a low-intensity civil war and Moscow’s current policy of building up Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has not succeeded in preventing the spread of violence.
The inability of Armenia and Azerbaijan to find any common ground in their conflict over Nagorno Karabakh undermines the chance of peace in the region and, without more constructive international engagement, increases the risk of outright war.
A revival of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols would benefit the entire region, but it will require increased effort to convince both the Turkish public and Azerbaijan to support the normalization process.